God even does not permit the existence of a thing with equal...

God even does not permit the existence of a thing with equal good and evil aspects, since this seems far from being a wise creation. It seems that the most controversial part of the above theory is its claim about the second kind. One crucial question may be that why God, being omnipotent, cannot create such things like corporeal objects so that they never (even not in the minor cases) result in evil.

In order to answer the above question, Muslim philosophers insist on the necessary relation between major good and minor evil aspects in this kind of beings. To clarify this claim they frequently call our attention to the necessary characteristics of our material world. First, in the whole hierarchical order of the universe, the material sensory word lies in a lower level than that of the nonmaterial world which is the world of the incorporeal intellects.

The latter, as I indicted before, is void of any kind of evil. But, if the former is to be without evil, it cannot still remain as the material world but will change into the higher world; i.e., the world of intellects. In short, it is impossible for the material world to be without evil since, in this given case, the material world comes to be not the material world, which is absurd!

Avicenna puts the question and his proposed answer in this way: If [however] it is said, "Why is evilness not prevented from it to begin with so that it would be entirely good?" one would then say:[If evilness was prevented from it] then [these things] would not be what they are, … [[and]] 23 their existence would [no longer] be the existence which is theirs, but the existence of other things that have come to be which are other than they are and which have been realized.

[By this] I mean what is created in such a way that evil have not follow from it primarily. (Avicenna, 2005, p. 346) Second, we consider that motion, change and other limitations, as the essential aspects of the material world, necessarily lead, though in the minor cases, to some clashes and contrasts among corporeal beings, which in their turn bring about some minor evils.

Suhravardi claims: Adversity and evil only are the requirements [of things] in the world of glooms [originating] from motions. (Suhrawardi, 1373, p. 235) Since the material world receives all these properties through its matter and hyle, the hyle is originally responsible for evils.