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Shiavault - a Vault of Shia Islamic Books The Analytic Turn in Early Twentieth-century Philosophy 2- Wittgenstein and Other Philosophers: Connective and Explicatory Analysis As mentioned above, the first phase of analytic philosophy culminated in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus , and in the late 1920s and early 1930s the conception (or conceptions) of analysis involved in the programme of logical atomism were subjected to increasing critique, with the result that new conceptions of analysis emerged, which might be broadly characterized as connective or explicatory rather than reductive conceptions.

This development is the main theme of the papers in Part Two. In the paper that opens Part Two, ‘Analytic Philosophy: Beyond the Linguistic Turn and Back Again’, Peter Hacker offers an overview of the history of analytic philosophy and the conceptions of analysis it involves. In the first section, he divides analytic philosophy into four phases.

The first is the one with which we have mainly been concerned so far, inaugurated by Russell’s and Moore’s rebellion against idealism and culminating in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus (though I would wish to accord a greater role to Frege in the story than Hacker acknowledges here); the second involved the Cambridge School of Analysis active in the 1920s and early 1930s; the third was the heyday of the Vienna Circle in the 1930s; and the fourth combined post-war Oxford philosophy, led by Ryle and Austin, with the later philosophy of Wittgenstein and his pupils.

Whether we are now witnessing a fifth phase or the death of analytic philosophy Hacker leaves as an open question. In the second section, he notes the conceptions of analysis involved in each phase, from the decompositional conception of Russell and Moore, through Russell’s later reductive conception and the differing views of logical analysis of the early Wittgenstein and Carnap, to the connective conception of the later Wittgenstein, Ryle and Strawson.

Although he denies that analytic philosophy can be defined by reference to any methods of analysis, he nevertheless suggests that it can be broadly characterized by its concern, first, with formal logic, and second, with language and its uses. But this characterization permits widespread disagreement within the analytic tradition about the relationship between formal logic and natural language. Indeed, Hacker suggests that there has been polarization on the issue throughout its history.