More specifically...

More specifically, Hanna argues, it emerged from Wittgenstein’s rejection of his earlier direct-referentialist semantics and picture theory of meaning, and from his elaboration of the idea that logic is ‘grammar’.

Hanna calls Wittgenstein’s later conception ‘dialectical conceptual analysis’, which “(a) displays and diagnoses the dialectical structure of philosophical problems, (b) describes, unpacks, compares, and contrasts the concepts implicit in our various ordinary uses of language and states truisms about them, and then (c) stops” (p. [18] below).

This brings us back to Kant, Hanna suggests, the main difference being the explicit recognition on Wittgenstein’s part of the role that linguistic behaviour plays in our cognitive activities. Philosophical analysis, Hanna concludes, “is ultimately rational anthropology in a wide sense that includes the theory of language: the logically-guided universal normative theory of human rationality ” (p. [21] below).

According to Hanna, Tractarian logical analysis had two main aims - to offer a critique of language and to reveal the deep structure of our language and thought. In ‘Complete Analysis and Clarificatory Analysis in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus ’, Dawn Phillips looks at the relationship between these two aims in more detail, although she prefers to talk of two conceptions of analysis being involved here.

She begins by explaining why a critique of language is necessary - because of our misunderstanding of the logic of our language, reflected in our failing to recognize how the linguistic signs we use symbolize. She argues, however, that there is a problem in Wittgenstein’s conception of how to correct this misunderstanding.

For “in order to recognize the symbol in the sign”, Wittgenstein writes, “we must consider the significant use [ den sinnvollen Gebrauch ]” (3.326), that is, we must consider when the sign is used in accord with the rules of logical syntax. But if we can do this, then it would seem that we must already recognize the symbol in the sign, i.e., already understand the logic of our language.

What we have here is a version of the paradox of analysis, and to solve this problem, Phillips suggests, we need to distinguish between complete analysis and clarificatory analysis.