Moran illustrates this in section 5 of his paper...

Moran illustrates this in section 5 of his paper, in discussing Husserl’s early account of our grasp of the concept of number. Husserl distinguishes the psychic acts that he regards as essential in our coming to grasp the concept of number, such as the intellectual synthesis he calls ‘collective combination’, from the psychic acts that may be involved on particular occasions but are not essential, such as our ability to order things in space and time.

After the Philosophy of Arithmetic , Husserl’s attention shifted to the foundations of logic and epistemology, and Moran explains the development of Husserl’s method in the two volumes of his Logical Investigations (1900-1). Husserl described this work himself as “the result of ten-year long efforts for a clarification of the pure idea of logic by a return to the bestowing of sense or the performance of cognition which occurs in the nexus of lived experiences of logical thinking” (quoted on p.

[19] below). Such a search for clarification can be found illustrated in Husserl’s discussion of the sense in which we talk of mathematical objects ‘existing’. Moran ends by addressing the question of the relationship between phenomenological analysis and linguistic analysis. According to Husserl, the latter is at best only a preliminary to the former, the aim of which is to uncover the a priori forms of consciousness - the necessary conditions of our apprehension of objects.

Husserl’s method of phenomenological analysis is also discussed in the final two papers of Part Three, Leila Haaparanta comparing it with ancient Greek geometrical analysis and Amie Thomasson comparing it with the form of conceptual analysis found in the later ordinary language tradition of analytic philosophy.

In ‘The Method of Analysis and the Idea of Pure Philosophy in Husserl’s Transcendental Phenomenology’, Haaparanta begins by offering a characterization of ‘pure’ philosophy, in terms of the exclusion of argumentation based on empirical beliefs, and then clarifies the process of ‘phenomenological reduction’, understood as the movement from the ‘natural attitude’ to the ‘philosophical attitude’ whereby the various assumptions and commitments of everyday life and science are ‘bracketed’ in order to find the underlying logical forms and essential concepts.