Russell was far more successful than Moore in this regard...

Russell was far more successful than Moore in this regard, most importantly, because he was able to draw on and develop quantificational logic, driven by his aim of demonstrating logicism. This led to the more complex form of analysis exemplified by the theory of descriptions, combining transformative logical analysis with decompositional metaphysical analysis.

What characterizes the analytic turn in giving rise to analytic philosophy, then, was this synthesis of two forms of analysis, and what has characterized analytic philosophy ever since is the continually developing syntheses of forms of analysis that have their roots in the work of the early analytic philosophers. Those forms have evolved in response to the changing epistemological and metaphysical environments.

As I said above, this volume focuses on certain key figures in early analytic philosophy and phenomenology in the period prior to the Second World War. As I have tried to bring out, a revealing picture of the development of philosophical analysis emerges. But even in the period concerned, there are many other significant figures and relationships, consideration of which would shed further light on this development.

A fuller story would have to include, for example, the debate about analysis among those connected with the Cambridge School of Analysis,[^20] the interaction between Wittgenstein and the various members of the Vienna Circle,[^21] the impact of Carnap and other logical empiricists on the American scene,[^22] the transformation of phenomenology by Martin Heidegger (1889-1976),[^23] and Ryle’s early engagement with phenomenology.[^24] In the wider context, there are also relationships between philosophers within and without the two traditions that are important in understanding the differing conceptions of analysis.

The debate between Russell and Joachim is discussed by Griffin, but Russell also sparred, for example, with Henri Bergson (1859-1941), who was a very influential figure in the first half of the twentieth century and whose ideas on the superiority of ‘intuition’ over analysis Russell criticized.[^25] Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) was even more important, and the influence of psychoanalysis on philosophical methodology and on Wittgenstein’s method, in particular, has frequently been discussed.[^26] There are also other philosophers who wrote on methodology and who developed conceptions of analysis in direct opposition to those of analytic philosophers, most notably, R.

G.