But methodological prudence ...

But methodological prudence , so to speak, cannot consist simply of a set of rules and meta-rules for the formulation and application of rules, which in turn would generate the same problems of definition and application, but at a higher level, ‘for the error is not in the law nor in the legislator but in the nature of the thing’[^39] . Therefore, prudence also constitutes the criterion of application, interpretation and, when necessary, modification or violation of the rule.

Aristotelian prudence is rooted in the indelegable experience and in responsibility - in the risk, Pierre Aubenque would say - of each human being. Man cannot cede the risk of decision and action (nor, obviously, can the scientist) to any rule or automatic process of decision. Not even the laws of the city can be applied completely literally. Aristotle warned that such a process could lead to grave injustice.

The application of the law to the case requires something very much like prudence: equity ( epieíkeia )[^40] .

‘The reason is that all law is universal but about some things it is not possible to make a universal statement which shall be correct.’[^41] The proper application of the law is not guaranteed by science alone, as in the case of Plato’s king-philosopher, but rather science itself, for belonging to the general, is subject to the same problems as the law in its relation with the concrete[^42] .

But this does not condemn us to irrationality or to subjectivism in our practical decisions, for prudence is not science, yet neither is it simple opinion or skill[^43] , it is genuine rational knowledge with the intention of objective truth. Research must be understood as a part of human action, decisions taken in it are practical decisions falling under the jurisdiction of the Aristotelian concept of practical truth, the type of truth that prudence seeks[^44] .

In conclusion, Aristotle achieves a noticeable integration of knowledge and human action, of freedom and nature, as well as of the ends of science which we call instrumentalist and realist. This composition is not arrived at in the Platonic way, where the science of Ideas will be the ultimate practical guide. Aubenque assures us that: ‘in man, Aristotle does not set one against the other, but maintains both: contemplative vocation and practical demand.