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Shiavault - a Vault of Shia Islamic Books A Guide To Locke's Essay Personal Identity The person is something else entirely.
Locke's account of the demonstrability of morality relied upon an abstract conception of the moral agent, or "the Moral Man," understood simply in terms of its functions in contemplating and performing actions-"a corporeal rational Being." [Essay III xi 16] But that is precisely the definition Locke now provides for the notion of the "Self" or "Person:" It is a Forensick Term appropriating Actions and their Merit; and so belongs only to intelligent Agents capable of a Law, and Happiness and Misery.
[Essay II xxvii 26] But since the person is a different kind of thing, the criteria for the identity of a particular person through time will also be different from those that apply for substances, composites, and even living human beings.
Having defined the person in terms of its function rather than by reference to its underlying nature, Locke explicitly maintained that the identity of a conscious person is independent of the identity of whatever substance (or substances) happen to compose it at any time.
[Essay II xxvii 9-10] This view has some clear advantages in the effort to provide a secure foundation for moral reasoning: a non-substantial account personal identity renders morally irrelevant all metaphysical disputes about human nature, since the continued existence of the same substance-material or immaterial-is neither necessary nor sufficient for that of the moral agent.
[Essay II xxvii 24-25] In particular, Locke took great pains in showing that the Cartesian account of human nature, as an immaterial thinking substance existing in uneasy alliance with a differentiated portion of the material universe, is inadequate for the allocation of just punishment to the same moral agent who commits an immoral act. Several of Locke's notorious "puzzle cases" are intended precisely to undermine any attempt at a Cartesian explanation of moral accountability.
[Essay II xxvii 10-14] The other "puzzle cases" illustrate the independence of personal identity from the animal identity of any human organism. Although "same person" and "same human being" are sometimes used interchangeably in ordinary discourse, Locke noted, they are philosophically distinct.