When philosophy concerns itself with revelation...

When philosophy concerns itself with revelation, it invariably constructs models of agency and ethical action distinguishing between that which belongs to the Divine and that which belongs to the human. The models present distinctions of similarity, as in acts of mercy; and of difference, as in acts of creation. Both types of action are ethical in nature, that is, they are oriented to bringing about some good result.

But the human being can achieve agency only in acts of mercy not in acts of creation, i.e., only where there is a created similarity and never at the point of difference between the divine and the human. As is clear from revelation, the human being performs no real act of creation since it is beyond the creature's capacity to bring anything into existence.

Although it is common to speak of "human creativity" this type of action is always merely a refashioning of an already created substance or form. Indeed, the mark of Abrahamic tradition regarding the being of God and the being of the human is the singularly fundamental distinction between Creator and creature. Creative action is a unique category of divine agency and can only be passively witnessed to or received as a gift by creaturely, human agents.

When considering any agential act, it is also necessary to recognize its personal, individual origin. Although it is common to think in terms of collective action in terms of contractual agreements and concerted efforts of groups from pairs to entire populations, the agency of the individual never disappears from human events. Indeed, at the legal level, and above all the moral level, it is revelation and reason unambiguously point to personal agency in all actions and events in creation.

As the human being achieves full consciousness and conscientious awareness in relation to others, the self fully emerges as a sense of personal identity and accountability. The self and the sense of self in identity and accountability are not so important in terms of the errors to which it is prone, but in terms of the good of which it is capable. This is a crucial point when considering human ethical action at the point of similarity with Divine action.

While the fundamental distinction between divine and human action is never erased, nor could it be, these two agencies disclose their similarity not only at the point of good outcomes, but even more at the point of their personal natures.