Yet, paradoxically, as Husserl will attest in his Formal and...

Yet, paradoxically, as Husserl will attest in his Formal and Transcendental Logic (1929)[^12] , it is an essential part of phenomenology’s brief to explore ‘the sense of transcendence’ ( Sinn der Transzendenz , FTL § 93c, p. 230; Hua XVII: 237), that is, the manner in which we have experience of an objective world as such.

While Husserl always insisted that phenomenology proceeds in immanence, in an important essay on the relation between Thomism and phenomenology, Edith Stein points out that Husserl was seeking a region of genuine immanence in the sense of a region of immediate, inviolable self-givenness, from which all doubt is excluded, but no matter how much he attempted to transcendentally purify his starting…