The pure phenomenon contains an intentional referring beyond...

The pure phenomenon contains an intentional referring beyond itself but that must be treated precisely as it is given in immanent seeing and this brings us squarely into the phenomenological perspective, or as Husserl puts it, ‘and thus we drop anchor on the shore of phenomenology’ ( und so werfen wir schon Anker an der Küste der Phänomenologie , IP, p. 34; Hua II: 45).

Continuing the metaphor Husserl warns that this shore has its share of rocks, is covered by clouds of obscurity and threatened with the gales of scepticism. We have what is given absolutely and purely in immanence: On the other hand, the relation to something transcendent, whether I question the existence ( Sein ) of the transcendent object or the ability of the relation to make contact ( Triftigkeit ) with it, still contains something that can be apprehended within the pure phenomenon.

The relating-itself-to-something transcendent ( Das sich-auf-Transzendentes-beziehen ), to refer to it in one way or another, is an inner characteristic of the phenomenon. (IP, p. 35; Hua II: 46) It is worth rehearsing Husserl’s first tentative uncovering of the transcendent at the heart of the immanent in these lectures as a guide to what is the relation between phenomenology and transcendence.

Not every transcendence is excluded; there is a genuine transcendence recognised that is the counterpart of the pure immanence of absolute givenness. But about this genuine transcendence Husserl has little to say in these years other than to point to the subject-transcending nature of validity, truth and other values. From out of the ‘Heraclitean stream of Erlebnisse (IP, p. 36; Hua II 47) comes a consciousness of unity, of identity, of transcendence, objectivity, and so on. How is that possible?

Husserl furthermore acknowledges that the mere apprehension of the cogitatio in itself is of little value, what matters is the turn towards the eidos . Indeed, the possibility of the critique of knowledge depends on the recognition of forms of givenness other than the singular hic et nunc . We already move beyond these cogitationes themselves when we make judgements about what is true, valid, and so on. The first genuine transcendence within immanence is then the intuition of the eidos .