“Since prior to the existence of the universe...

“Since prior to the existence of the universe, it was equally possible for it to be or not-to-be, a determinant whereby the possibility of being could prevail over non-being was required; and this determinant was God.”[^50] The problem in understanding what the mutakallim mean by this principle is whether or not it spoke of a determinant as an efficient cause or reason.[^51] Craig states: “according to al-Ghazali, the principle of determination, in the sense of sufficient reason, is simply invalid with regards to God.”[^52] Thus, for al-Ghazali, God as determinant was believed to be God as an efficient cause of the existence of the universe.[^53] As such, al-Ghazali replied that the world came into existence when it did, through the divine will (the efficient cause).[^54] The will is an attribute of the divine and like the attribute of knowledge, which possesses particular characteristics, the will is “an attribute whose function is to differentiate a thing from its similar.”[^55] This, however, may seem contradictory to the philosopher, who might respond that the definition of two things being “similar” is that there is no way to discern between the two.[^56] Al-Ghazali answered that the philosophers might be confusing the fact that human will and divine will are not analogous, that in fact, there may be a problem with language at this point.[^57] Since there is an attribute of God that is able to choose between two similar things, the term “will” may be problematic.

Since religious law, however, permits the use of the word “will” to apply to this attribute, it is sufficient for use.[^58] Ibn Rushd highlighted this in his response to al-Ghazali; in his Tahafut al-Tahafut , he noted that there is a difference between will and action.[^59] Providing a possible solution to al-Ghazali’s dilemma, Ibn Rushd proposed that To suppose that the world, willed by God eternally, has come into being after a certain lapse of time is logically admissible, but not that it has followed His action after such a lapse of time, unless we assume that He was impeded by some defect or impotence, which is absurd.[^60] The universe, therefore, was a product of God’s power and action, not a product of the will.

This is important since, Ibn Rushd, according to Fakhry, stated that the notion of an “eternal will” is contradictory, just as a square circle or a married bachelor would be a contradiction.