Some made the claim that Mu’tazilah theology...

Some made the claim that Mu’tazilah theology, with its focus on human reason, is rising to prominence once again in post-colonial Muslim countries.

See Martin, Woodman, with Atmaja, Defenders of Reason in Islam: Mu‘tazilism from Medieval School to Modern Symbol (Oxford: Oneworld, 1997) [^19] William Lane Craig, The Kalam Cosmological Argument (London: Macmillan, 1979), 7-[^8]: Craig lists the six arguments typically employed by the mutakallimun for this demonstration: the argument from the contrary nature of simple bodies; the argument from experience; the argument from the finitude of motion, time and temporal objects; the argument from the world’s composition of finite parts; the argument from contingency; the argument from temporality.

Craig notes that the first and second arguments were not influential, and that the third and fourth arguments come from the Alexandria Christian theologian John Philoponus (Yahya al-Nahwi). See also Fakhry, “Classical Islamic Arguments,” 135. [^20] Fakhry, “Classical Islamic Arguments,” [^136]: [^21] For a further discussion on the mutakallim doctrine of change with atoms and accidents, see Andrey Smirnov, “Causality in Islamic Thought,” in E. Deutch and R.

Bontekoe, A Companion to World Philosophies (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997) 493-[^503]: [^22] Peter Kreeft & Ronald K. Tacelli, Handbook of Christian Apologetics (Downer’s Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1994) [^58]: This syllogism is based from al-Ghazali’s works, the Iqtisad and the Jerusalem Letter.

[^23] Craig, The Kalam Cosmological Argument, [^44]: [^24] Al-Ghazali, Incoherence of the Philosophers, [^13]: [^25] Al-Ghazali, Incoherence of the Philosophers, [^13]: [^26] Al-Ghazali, Incoherence of the Philosophers, [^13]: [^27] Al-Ghazali, Incoherence of the Philosophers, [^14]: [^28] Al-Ghazali, Incoherence of the Philosophers, [^15]: [^29] Craig, Kalam Cosmological Argument, [^12]: [^30] Al-Ghazali, Incoherence of the Philosophers, [^15]: [^31] Al-Ghazali, Incoherence of the Philosophers, [^16]: Al-Ghazali offers the analogy of a man pronouncing divorce from his wife.

Once a man makes the legal pronouncement of divorce, and separation does not occur, “it is inconceivable for it to occur thereafter.” For the actual pronouncement is the “cause of the judgment.” The only way a delay in the affect of the pronouncement could occur is if the man affixes some condition to the utterance (e.g.