It is in this connection that Wittgenstein’s theory of the...

It is in this connection that Wittgenstein’s theory of the meaningfulness of signs , generally missed by standard interpretations, proves to be an especially important part of the Tractatus theory of meaning. The theory unfolds in a series of remarks at the thematic center of the Tractatus , in the immediate context of the development of the picture theory and the introduction of the idea of a perspicuous notation capable of clarifying the logical structure of ordinary propositions.

It begins with a distinction that Wittgenstein draws between signs - mere perceptible spoken sounds or (token) written marks [^113] - and symbols , which are signs taken together with the ways in which they signify: 3.32 A sign is what can be perceived of a symbol 3.321 So one and the same sign (written or spoken, etc.) can be common to two different symbols - in which case they will signify in different ways.

3.322 Our use of the same sign to signify two different objects can never indicate a common characteristic of the two, if we use it with two different modes of signification. For the sign, of course, is arbitrary. So we could choose two different signs instead, and then what would be left in common on the signifying side?

In these remarks, Wittgenstein characterizes symbols as signs together with their “modes of signification,” their “use[s] with a sense,” or their “logico-syntactical employment.”[^114] Prior to an understanding of their logico-syntactical employment, signs themselves are inert, incapable of defining by themselves a logical form in virtue of which they could correspond to possible states of affairs.

For it is, of course, arbitrary that a particular orthographic or audible sign should be chosen for a particular expressive purpose within a particular language; what makes arbitrary signs capable of signifying the states of affairs that they do - what gives them meaning - are the logical possibilities of their significant use: 3.326 In order to recognize a symbol by its sign we must observe how it is used with a sense.

3.327 A sign does not determine a logical form unless it is taken together with its logico-syntactical employment. 3.328 If a sign is useless, it is meaningless. That is the point of Occam’s maxim. (If everything behaves as if a sign had…