However...

However, we may observe, that, in such a case, he would have no cause to complain of experience; because it commonly informs us beforehand of the uncertainty, by that contrariety of events, which we may learn from a diligent observation. All effects follow not with like certainty from their supposed causes.

Some events are found, in all countries and all ages, to have been con- stantly conjoined together: Others are found to have been more variable, and sometimes to disappoint our expecta- tions; so that, in our reasonings concerning matter of fact, there are all imaginable degrees of assurance, from the highest certainty to the lowest species of moral evidence. A wise man, therefore, proportions his belief to the evidence.

In such conclusions as are founded on an infal- lible experience, he expects the event with the last degree of assurance, and regards his past experience as a full proof of the future existence of that event.

In other cases, he proceeds with more caution: he weighs the opposite experiments: he considers which side is sup- ported by the greater number of experiments: to that side he inclines, with doubt and hesitation; and when at last he fixes his judgement, the evidence exceeds not what we properly call probability.

All probability, then, supposes an opposition of experiments and observations, where the one side is found to overbalance the other, and to produce a degree of evidence, proportioned to the superiority. A hundred instances or experiments on one side, and fifty on another, afford a doubtful expectation of any event; though a hundred uniform experiments, with only one that is con- tradictory, reasonably beget a pretty strong degree of as- surance.

In all cases, we must balance the opposite experi- ments, where they are opposite, and deduct the smaller number from the greater, in order to know the exact force of the superior evidence. To apply these principles to a particular instance; we may observe, that there is no species of reasoning more common, more useful, and even necessary to human life, than that which is derived from the testimony of men, and the reports of eye-witnesses and spectators.

This species of reasoning, perhaps, one may deny to be founded on the relation of cause and effect. I shall not dispute about a word.