ভূমিকা

Shiavault - a Vault of Shia Islamic Books An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding Section Xii of the Acadimical Or Sceptical Philosophy PART I THERE is not a greater number of philosophical reason- ings, displayed upon any subject, than those, which prove the existence of a Deity, and refute the falla- cies of Atheists; and yet the most religious philosophers still dispute whether any man can be so blinded as to be a speculative atheist. How shall we reconcile these contra- dictions?

The knights errant, who wandered about to clear the world of dragons and giants, never entertained the least doubt with regard to the existence of these monsters. The Sceptic is another enemy of religion, who naturally provokes the indignation of all divines and graver philoso- phers; though it is certain, that no man ever met with any such absurd creature, or conversed with a man, who had no opinion or principle concerning any subject, either of action or speculation.

This begets a very natural question; What is meant by a sceptic? And how far it is possible to push these philosophical principles of doubt and uncertainty? There is a species of scepticism, antecedent to all study and philosophy, which is much inculcated by Des Cartes and others, as a sovereign preservative against error and precipitate judgement.

It recommends an universal doubt, not only of all our former opinions and principles, but also of our very faculties; of whose veracity, say they, we must assure ourselves, by a chain of reasoning, deduced from some original principle, which cannot possibly be fallacious or deceitful.

But neither is there any such original principle, which has a prerogative above others, that are self-evident and convincing: or if there were, could we advance a step beyond it, but by the use of those very faculties, of which we are supposed to be already diffident.

The Cartesian doubt, therefore, were it ever possible to be attained by any human creature (as it plainly is not) would be entirely in- curable; and no reasoning could ever bring us to a state of assurance and conviction upon any subject.

It must, however, be confessed, that this species of scep- ticism, when more moderate, may be understood in a very reasonable sense, and is a necessary preparative to the study of philosophy, by preserving a proper impartiality in our judgements, and weaning our mind from all those preju- dices, which we may have imbibed from education or rash opinion.