Obviously...

Obviously, Fred neither made a promise nor gave consent to a request from Sheila's parents or Sheila herself to save Sheila when she is in danger. However, not giving consent does not sufficiently exempt Fred from his moral obligation to save Sheila in such a situation.

To me, what makes Fred morally obligated in this case is the existential or factical "being" of Fred, Sheila, and John rather than Fred's intentional consent that is crucial in Fred's moral obligation to try to save Sheila.(7) Similar examples in our contemporary social and moral life can also be found in the cases such as the moral obligation of the present generation of human beings to protect the ecological environment and to preserve some of the natural resources for future generations, a citizen's obligation to defend her home country, a patient's obligation not to have physical contact with healthy persons if she knows that she has an infectious disease, etc.

All of these demonstrate that at least some of our commonly and ordinarily accepted and practiced moral obligations can be justified without being preconditioned by the mutual consent of the moral agents involved in the action.

That is to say, they are, pace Daniels, "asymmetrical" rather than "symmetrical." In order to make the point clearer, I would like to call an attention to the nature of our understanding of "ought" or "moral obligation." When we say "A ought (not) to do X," or "A is obligated (not) to do X," it seems to me that we often have a confusion between two types of "ought/obligation."(8) One type of "ought/obligation" is caused solely by the intentional consent of competent moral agents involved in the action, and I call this moral responsibility .(9) That is to say, a competent moral agent should be morally responsible for the consequences caused by her consensual action.

Compared with moral responsibility, moral duty is another type of "ought/obligation." It does not necessarily depend on the competent moral agent's intentional consent. It is rather determined mainly by what kind of existential situation a moral agent is in and what kind of social role she plays. For example, a normal and healthy person is obligated to yield to a handicapped person because the latter is handicapped.

Similarly, a hostess is obligated to show her hospitality to her guests while a stranger is not.