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Shiavault - a Vault of Shia Islamic Books Legal Comparability and Cultural Identity: the Case of Legal Reasoning in Jewish and Islamic Traditions Legal Reasoning: Structure and Theology ========================================== It follows that Islamic Law everywhere strives to go back to direct the pronouncements of the founder, thus veritably developing a strictly historical method, while both Talmudic and Canon Law seek to make their points by means, not of historical fact-finding, but of logical deduction (logischer Ableitung).

For deduction is subconsciously determined by the goal of the deduction, that is to say the present, and therefore it gives contemporary power over the past. Investigation, on the other hand, makes the present dependent on the past. Even in this seemingly pure world of law, then, one can still recognize the difference between the commandment to love and the obedience to law.

Franz Rosenzweig[^17] Interestingly, Rosenzweig observes legal reasoning as a typological differentiator between the three monotheistic legal systems – Islamic, Talmudic[^18] and Canon law. He portrays two types of confronting legal theories: on the one hand, Islamic law is based on nostalgic jurisprudence , is highly committed to historical facts,[^19] and accordingly celebrates obedience to law as the supreme value.

On the other hand, Talmudic and Canon law, as future-oriented systems, are based on deductive reasoning , much less constrained by the law and hence emphasize the virtue of love as the ultimate divine commandment. Rozenzweig’s observations are, however, peculiar and incompatible with common scholarly accounts on both Jewish and Islamic legal systems.

First, against the view of mainstream Rabbinic theology as legalist by nature, he describes Jewish law in Christian and antinomian terms as an expression of the ultimate commandment to love. Second, and perhaps even more irreconcilable with our usual understanding, is his presentation of Islamic law in opposition to the use of deductive reasoning.

While one can deny viewing Jewish law as based on a future-oriented jurisprudence, it is much more difficult to agree with Rosenzweig’s observation that Islamic law is not deductive. In fact, his position is a total denial of the fourth root Sunni jurisprudence, which is the jurist’s independent reasoning – qiyas or ijtihād .