Accordingly...
Accordingly, the expansion of the law is based on an existing causal component (cause, reason or meaning) shared by both the existing law and the new case.[^29] Resemblance-based qiyas, on the other hand, is based on the isomorphic resemblance of the two cases.[^30] These two types of qiyas thus illustrate distinct associations between an existing law and a new case: while in cause-based qiyas a shared element associates the two cases, in resemblance-based qiyas the isomorphic likeness allows their association.
That is, cause-based qiyas connects the two cases by means of a third factor - the underlying cause, while resemblance-based qiyas connects the two to one another intrinsically. 2.2 Epistemology and Legal Theology There are two people in the same state and under the same king, living two lives and under two jurisdictions, clergy and laity, spiritual and carnal, sacerdotium and regnum.
Stephen of Tournai [^31] The identification of the law with the ‘Word of God’ is indeed a central principle for both Judaism and Islam. Consequently, a great degree of correlation between legal propositions and theological principles is anticipated. From the very outset, Medieval Jewish and Islamic laws emphasized the transparent relationship between the positive contents of the law and the perception of God as the ultimate legislator.
Thus, in many respects, knowing the law and applying it correctly are equivalent to the reception of divine revelation. As such, legal epistemology is reliant upon its theological assumptions, so that the epistemological prepositions are mixed together with the theological claims about the nature of God and His relation to the believers.
This aspect singles out the uniqueness of these legal systems in that the source of legitimacy in Jewish and Islamic laws is epistemological rather than institutional.
Due to the association of legal theology and epistemology, many of the debates about legal reasoning are associated with theological discussions about the nature of human reasoning from a theological point of view: is legal reasoning essentially no more than an interpreting faculty, or is it, alternatively, an autonomous source of knowledge?[^32] To illustrate the dependency of epistemology on theology and its implications on the theoretical structure of the law, we shall refer to a metaphor that is commonly mentioned in Islamic jurisprudential discussion to support legal reasoning.