Critique It is not acceptable to assume that from the...

Critique It is not acceptable to assume that from the beginning of its existence the intellect has specific concepts, and that it is mixed with them, or that after a while it understands them automatically and without the effect of any other factor. The conscience of every aware human being denies this, whether the assumed concepts are related to the material or related to the abstract, or whether it accords with both areas.

Supposing that a series of concepts are necessary for the nature and constitution of the intellect, it cannot be proved that they represent reality, and at most it can be said that a certain subject is accepted by the nature of the intellect, and it is probable that if the intellect had been created in another form, it would have perceived objects in other ways. To compensate for this deficiency, Descartes grasped hold of divine wisdom.

He said that if God had placed these concepts in the nature of the intellect, contrary to reality and truth, he necessarily would have been a deceiver. However, it is clear that the attributes of Almighty God, and His lack of deception must be proved by intellectual reasons. But if intellectual perceptions are not correct the basis of this argument collapses. The guarantee of its correctness through this argument is circular. Suppose that intellectual concepts came from a change in sensory forms.

This would require that a form which changes and is transformed into an intellectual concept would not retain its original form, however, with the appearance of universal concepts in the mind; concomitantly and simultaneously we see that sensory and imaginary forms retain their own states. Moreover, it is only material existents which are apt to change, while perceptual forms are abstract, as will be proved in its proper place.

Most of the intellectual concepts, such as the concept of cause and effect, do not have sensory or imaginary forms at all, so they cannot be said to come from changes in sensory forms. Suppose that sensory forms provide the stock and ground for intellectual concepts, and that they do not really change into them.

Although this is less problematic and closer to the truth [than the previous supposition], and is acceptable with respect to some whatish concepts, nevertheless, it is not proper to limit the grounds of intellectual concepts to sensory perceptions.