ভূমিকা

Shiavault - a Vault of Shia Islamic Books Philosophical Instructions Lesson Fourteen: Acquired Knowledge The Necessity for the Survey of Acquired Knowledge We saw that knowledge by presence is the finding of reality itself, and that therefore there is no way to have doubt or scruple about it. But we know that the range of presentational knowledge is limited and by itself it cannot provide a solution to the problems of epistemology.

If there were no way to ascertain facts by means of acquired knowledge, we would not logically be able to accept definite theories in any science, and even self-evident first principles would lose their definiteness and necessity, and only the name of self-evidence and necessity would remain with them. Therefore, it is necessary that we continue our endeavor to evaluate acquired knowledge and to obtain a criterion of truth for it.

For the sake of this we shall survey the various kinds of acquired knowledge. Idea and Affirmation Logicians divide knowledge into two parts: idea ( taṣawwur ) and affirmation ( taṣdīq ). In fact, they have limited the common concept of knowledge to acquired knowledge, and on the other hand, they have extended it to include simple ideas.

The literal meaning of taṣawwur is ‘to form an image’ and ‘to acquire a form,’ and in the terminology of the logicians it means a simple mental appearance which has the property of disclosing something beyond itself, such as the idea of Mount Damavand and the concept of mountain.

The literal meaning of taṣdīq is ‘to consider true’ and ‘to acknowledge,’ and in the terminology of logicians and philosophers it is used with two similar meanings, and in this respect it is considered to be ambiguous: a. a logical proposition which in simple form includes the subject, predicate, and judgment of unity; b. the judgment itself which is a simple matter and shows one’s belief in the unity of the subject and predicate.

Some modern Western logicians imagine that affirmation ( taṣdīq ) means the transference of the mind from one idea to another on the basis of the rules of the association of ideas. But this conception is incorrect, for neither is affirmation necessary everywhere there is an association of ideas, nor is an association of ideas required everywhere there is affirmation.