Ṣadr al-Muta’allihīn (Mullā Ṣadrā) mentions in the Asfār...

Ṣadr al-Muta’allihīn (Mullā Ṣadrā) mentions in the Asfār that the use of the word ‘existence’ with its copulative meaning is a special term with a meaning other than that with which it is commonly used, while its ordinary meaning is substantival and independent, and therefore using the word ‘existence’ with these two meanings must be considered a kind of equivocation. Some have not taken note of this point, and have considered the concept of existence to be absolutely univocal.

They have even gone so far as to try to establish entified relational existence by these concepts, explaining that, for example, when we say, “Ali is a scientist,” the expression “Ali” refers to a specific person, and for the word “scientist” there exists its science, which exists in the external world. Therefore, the concept of the relation of the proposition which is indicated by the word “is” refers to a objective relation between science and Ali.

Hence, in the context of the external world there also is established a kind of relational existence. There is a confusion here between the concepts and principles of logic with the concepts and principles of philosophy, and the principles of propositions which are about mental concepts contaminate the objective instances.

On this basis, they deny the existence of the relation in the ‘simple question’ ( halliyyah basīṭah, i.e., of the form ‘x exists’), for one cannot imagine a relation between a thing itself and its existence. But the existence of a relation in a proposition which refers to a simple thing does not require the objective existence of the relation in its instance, rather, basically, one can never consider the relation to be a entified objective thing.

What can finally be said about it is that the relation in a ‘simple question’ is a sign of the unity of the instance of the subject and the predicate, and in ‘compound questions’ it is the sign of their entified unity. It is strange that some of the Western philosophers have denied the substantival meaning of existence (predicative existence), and they have limited the concept of existence to the copulative meaning, considering it to be a relation between the subject and the predicate.

For this reason, they consider 'simple questions' to be pseudo-propositions, not real propositions, for they suppose that in reality such propositions doe not have predicates!