From this it may be observed that the concept of change is...

From this it may be observed that the concept of change is not a whatish concept for which genus and difference may be given, and it is only with difficulty that a clearer intellectual concept may be found which could be used to explain it, and for this reason it must be considered a self-evident concept.

Likewise, the concept of immutability, which is the contradictory of change, does not need any definition or explanation, and since it is abstracted from a single entified existence, it may be considered a positive concept and change a negative one. Perhaps for this sort of opposite abstracted concepts, either of them may be considered positive and the other negative.

The existence of the changing is also self-evident, and at the very least every person finds changes within his own internal states by presentational knowledge. However, immutable existence, which is not the object of any sort of change or alteration, must be established by proof. And in the previous part we became acquainted with some such proofs.

Types of Change Given the breadth of the concept of change, various kinds of change may be posited: The appearance of a substantial existent without previous matter, and in technical terms, creation ( ibdā‘ī ). An instance of this posit is the first material existent, for those who accept the temporal beginning of the material universe.

The complete destruction of a substantial existent, and an instance of it is the last material existent, according to the position of those who believe that the material universe will have a temporal end. The complete destruction of a substantial existent and the appearance of a new substantial existent in its place.

The occurrence of this posit is considered impossible by most philosophers, and at the very least it may be said that among ordinary phenomena no instances of this sort of change are to be found. The appearance of a substantial existent as an actual part of another substantial existent. A clear instance of this is vegetable forms, according to the position of those who consider vegetable forms to be substantial, and their materials to be actual existents.

The destruction of a part of a substantial existent without being replaced by another part, such as the death of a plant and its decomposition, according to the above-mentioned position.