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Shiavault - a Vault of Shia Islamic Books Philosophical Instructions Lesson Sixty-Eight: The Purpose of Creation Introduction One of the important problems of metaphysics and theology ( kalām ) is the problem of the purpose of creation, which has been the subject of discussions and different views. On the one hand, some experts have denied that divine deeds have a purpose or final cause.

On the other hand, there are those who consider the divine purpose to be to profit creatures; and there is a third group which believe in the unity of the efficient and final cause of immaterial entities. In general, in this area there have been many views the citation and critique of which would become overlong.

Therefore, first we will explain the concept of purpose and other similar philosophical expressions, then we will mention some useful introductory points in order to explain the problem and remove doubts about it, and finally, we will explain the correct meaning of divine purposefulness. Purpose and Final Cause The literal meaning of the word hadaf (purpose) is target.

In common conversation, it means the result of a voluntary action which is the aim of a voluntary agent from the beginning and for the sake of which the action is performed, so that if the result of the action had not been taken into account, the action would not have been performed.

The result of an action is called the end ( ghāyah ) insofar as it is the terminus of the action; it is called the purpose ( hadaf or gharaḍ ) insofar as it is taken into consideration and intended by the agent from the beginning; and it is called the final cause ( ‘illat-e ghā’ī ) insofar as the result of the action is desired and this desire is the cause for the will of the agent to be directed toward the performance of the action.

However, that which really influences the performance of the action is knowledge and the love of the result, not its objective existence; rather, the objective result is the effect of the action, not its cause.

The term ghāyah (end) is usually used in the sense of the terminus of a motion, and the relation between its instances and those of hadaf (purpose) is that of partial overlapping ( ‘umūm wa khuṣūṣ min wajh ), for, on the one hand, in natural motion no purpose can be considered for a natural agent, while the application of the concept of ghāyah to its terminus is correct.