Therefore...

Therefore, it may be said that a voluntary action depends on the agent’s considering the action to be agreeable with his own essence, and for this reason he desires it and likes it. At last sometimes a voluntary agent possesses all of its own perfections, and his affection pertains to an action in so far as it is an effect of his own perfection, as in the case of completely immaterial things.

Sometimes its affection pertains to a perfection it lacks, and the action is performed in order to obtain and reach that perfection, as with animal and human souls whose own voluntary actions are for the sake of reaching a state which is agreeable with their essences, and they obtain pleasure and benefit from it. The difference between these two sorts is that in the first case the affection for the existing perfection ( kamāl - e mawjūd ) is the source of the performance of the action.

However, in the second case, the affection for the ‘absent perfection’ ( kamāl - e mafqūd ) and yearning to obtain it is the source of the activity. Also, in the first case, the existing perfection is the ‘cause’ of the performance of the action, and by no means may it be considered an effect, but in the second case the absent perfection is obtained by means of the action, and it may be considered a kind of effect of it.

However, in both cases, the desire and affection for perfection is fundamental, and the desire and affection for the deed is subordinate. Perfection and Goodness A point to be noted is that what is meant by perfection here is an ontological attribute which is agreeable with the essence of the agent, which is sometimes the source of the performance of a voluntary action, and sometimes it comes into existence as an effect of the action.

A perfection which is obtained as an effect of a willful action is sometimes the ultimate perfection of the agent or a preliminary for reaching it. In this respect it is called real goodness ( khayr-e ḥaqīqī ) in philosophical terms. Sometimes it is merely agreeable with one of the faculties and powers of the agent, however much it may interfere with other perfections and its ultimate perfection, and, on balance harm the agent, and in this case it is called imagined goodness ( khayr-e maẓnūn ).

For example, a natural result of eating food is a perfection for the vegetative faculty, which is common to man, animals and plants.