Regarding the difference between the literal meanings of qaḍā’ and qadar ...

Regarding the difference between the literal meanings of qaḍā’ and qadar , one can consider the stage of qadar to be prior to qaḍā’ , because until the measure of something is determined it does not come to completion, and this is the point which is indicated in many noble aḥādīth .

A Philosophical Explanation of Destiny and Decree Some of the great scholars have identified destiny and decree with the causal relation among existents and have considered qadar to be ‘the contingent relation between a thing and its incomplete causes,’ and qaḍā’ to be ‘the necessary relation between and effect and its complete cause.’ That is, when an effect is compared with each of the parts of its complete cause or with all of them, except for the last part, the relation will be one of contingency by analogy ( imkān bil-qiyās ), and when it is compared to the entire complete cause, the relation will be one of necessity by analogy ( ḍarūrat bil-qiyās ), the former being called qadar and the latter qaḍā’ .

Although in itself this identification is acceptable, that which requires more attention here is the relation of causes and effects to God, the Supreme, for qaḍā’ and qadar are basically divine attributes of action, and must be discussed as such. In order to clarify the place of these attributes among the divine attributes, some points must be made about the levels which the intellect considers for the realization of an action.

Levels of Action Whenever the intellect considers an whatness which does not have to exist or not exist, in other words, whose relations to existence and nothingness are equal, it judges that in order to escape this indifference another existent is needed, which is called its cause.

This is the issue about which the philosophers have said, ‘the criterion of the need for a cause by an effect is whatish contingency ( imkān-e māhuwī ).’ It was previously said that according to the fundamentality of existence, contingency of whatness must be replaced by ontological poverty ( faqr wujūdī ).

If a cause is compounded of several things, all of its parts must be obtained in order for the effect to occur, for the assumption of the occurrence of an effect without one of the parts of its complete cause would mean the lack of efficiency of the absent part, and this would be contrary to the assumption that it is a part of the complete cause.