However...

However, considering that they are of a single whatness, they are called ‘one by species,’ and various species which essentially are a multiplicity of species are called ‘one by genus’ with respect to their unity of genus. Therefore, each existence in the external world has an individual unity. When more than one of these is taken into consideration, multiplicity is attributed to them.

Each of these two attributes, which are abstracted concepts and secondary intelligibles, are abstracted, according to [the doctrine of] the fundamentality of existence, from the existence of the existents. Hence, the existence also has unity and multiplicity beyond whatish unity and multiplicity. From this it may be guessed that various numbers, which are instances of multiplicity, are also secondary intelligibles, not primary intelligibles or whatish categories as most philosophers have held.

Other reasons could also be mentioned in support of this, which shall not be presented here. On the other hand, according to the fundamentality of whatness, whatish multiplicity is always a sign of the multiplicity of entified objective existents, for each of them by supposition refers to a specific entified aspect, although the multiplicity of existents in the external world does not always imply whatish multiplicity, as the multiplicity of individuals of a single whatness is not incompatible with the unity of their whatness.