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Shiavault - a Vault of Shia Islamic Books Philosophical Instructions Lesson Forty-One: The Material and the Immaterial Introduction Philosophers have propounded preliminary divisions for all existents, among which is the distinction between necessary existence and contingent existence.

Considering the fact that this distinction is made with regard to the relation between whatness and existence (necessity and contingency are obtained from the ‘matter’ of the proposition in the form of a ‘simple question’ [e.g., of the form ‘x exists’]), it is more compatible with the doctrine of the fundamentality of whatness.

On the basis of the fundamentality of existence, all existence may be divided into the independent and the relational ( rābiṭ ), or the self-sufficient ( ghanī , literally rich) and the poor ( faqīr ). That is, if an existent has absolutely no need of another and, in technical terms, is an ‘existent by itself’ ( mawjūd bi nafsih ), it is self-sufficient and independent, otherwise it is poor and relational.

It is clear that what is meant by self-sufficiency and independence are absolute self-sufficiency and absolute independence; otherwise, every cause possesses a relative self-sufficiency and independence in relation to its own effect.

It is self-evident that there are poor and relational existents, or contingent existence, which are concomitant with being effects, but that there is a self-sufficient and absolutely independent existent or a Necessary Existence in Itself ( bi al-dhāt ) which is concomitant with the First Cause is established by proof, a proof which was indicated in the discussions on cause and effect, and in the discussions of theology there will be further explanation of this.

Likewise, philosophers have divided the whatnesses of contingent existents into two groups: substance and accident.

They have called a whatness that is not in need of a subject in order to become an existent a ‘substance,’ and that which needs a subject, or in other words, a state or attribute for another existent, is called an ‘accident.’ It was previously indicated that it is well known among philosophers that accidental whatnesses, according to induction, possess nine higher genera, and with the addition of substance, this makes ten categories.

It seems that the concepts of substance and accident are secondary philosophical intelligibles which are obtained by comparing existents with each other.