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Shiavault - a Vault of Shia Islamic Books Discursive Theology Volume 1 Lesson 24: Evil and the Best Order One of the perennial central discussions in theology is the question of evil which is talked about in different topics. One of the topics in which it is discussed is the Divine Unity ( tawḥīd ) in creatorship ( khāliqiyyah ) because the dualists believe in two creators, viz. the creator of good and the creator of evil, and we have examined this matter in our discourses on the Divine Unity.

Another topic in which it is discussed is the question of the Divine justice which is approached from diverse perspectives. Sometimes it is through the angle of the cosmic justice and the best order of existence and at times through the outlook of the goal-orientedness of the universe and that the philosophy behind the world of nature is that the human being benefits from it while natural evils also inflict him.

Sometimes it is through the viewpoint that in the theistic worldview, some of the undesirable happenings are a result of man’s actions while these consequences usually affect not only the wrongdoers but the others as well. These are various cases in which ‘evil’ is mentioned as something in conflict with the justice of God (cosmic as well as retributory justice), and the Muslim philosophers and theologians have examined and resolved it through their respective ways.

In view of the broadness of the scope of this topic, we shall examine and analyze it in two lessons. The Skepticism on Evil and the Best Order We have mentioned in an earlier lesson the proof of the best order. The skepticism on evil in this regard holds that evil – natural, moral or human evil – is in conflict with the excellence of the order of nature and that the best order demands that the universe must be free from evil.

Reply [to the Skepticism] In reply to this skepticism on evil in relation to the best and most perfect order, the theosophers have embarked on the examination of the hypothetical kinds of the possible being ( mawjūd al-mumkin ) from the perspective of good and evil, and on the basis of the Divine providence ( ‘ināyah ) and wisdom ( ḥikmah ), they have concluded that only two kinds of it can be materialized; one is pure good while the other is the dominant and much good, but the materialization of other assumptions such as equal good and evil, dominant and much evil and pure evil is impossible.