“Indeed God...

“Indeed God, the Exalted, is just and wise… It is not inconceivable [for Him] to desire for [His] servants that which is contrary to what He commands, and to compel them to do something and punish them afterward [for doing so].”[^4] After pointing out that the existence of freewill in man is something axiomatic in that it requires no more proof, Ibn Maytham al-Baḥrānī has mentioned forms of warning two of which are as follows: Every reasonable person considers good to praise what is good and to condemn what is evil, and this point depends on the fact that the doer of good and the evildoer are the agents of their respective actions.

“Axiomatic perception testifies that our actions are traceable to us.”[^6] The Theologians’ Opinions on the Interpretation of Freewill The abovementioned rational and textual proofs affirm the principle of freewill for man. On this basis, belief in predeterminism in actions is invalid. Now, let us see how the Muslim theologians have interpreted freewill. On the interpretation of freewill, three views have been advanced, viz.

(1) tafwīḍ (total delegation), (2) kasb (acquisition), and (3) amr bayn al-amrayn (position between two positions). Now, we shall examine these three views: 1. The Theory of Tafwīḍ The outcome of the theory of tafwīḍ is that the voluntary action of man is brought into being by himself alone and it is not a creation ( makhlūq ) of God. The attribution of man’s action to God is not a real attribution.

It rather means that God had created man and has given him the ability to do an action, but He has no involvement in the performance or non-performance of any single human act. That is, his action is ontologically delegated to him. The proofs presented by Qāḍī ‘Abd al-Jabbār al-Mu‘tazilī for this theory are as follows: Man’s actions depend on his motive and intention. He does whatever he intends. He does not do whatever he does not intend.