The second view is compatible with the criteria of...
The second view is compatible with the criteria of discursive intellect ( ‘aql-e naẓarī ) while the third view is harmonious with the standards of practical intellect ( ‘aql-e ‘amalī ). The discussion on the excellence of order belongs to the sphere of theoretical intellect while the discussion on the exigency of an action pertains to the domain of practical intellect. We shall review these two views later.
No explanation or justification of the fourth view has ever been transmitted, and it has been put forth as a mere claim. A review of it shall be made after the following examination. While considering irādah an Essential Attribute of God, the fifth view has treated it as contingent ( ḥādith ). It is evident that pre-existence ( azaliyyah ) and contingency ( ḥudūth ) cannot go hand in hand.
The sixth view is also unacceptable because irādah is one of the Positive Attributes ( al-ṣifat al-thubūtiyyah ) and not one of the Negative Attributes ( al-ṣifāt al-salbiyyah ). Therefore, it must be not identified as a Negative Attribute. The point of strength of the seventh view is in interpreting irādah in the realms of Essence and Action.
Yet, the problem with this view is in treating the concepts of exaltation ( ibtihāj ) and contentment ( riḍā’ ) as identical with those of will ( irādah ) and decree ( mashiyyah ), and interchanging the two concepts is similar to interchanging knowledge and power, which is inadmissible. In addition, traditions stipulate that irādah is contingent and one of the Attributes of Action, and not an Attribute of Essence.
An Examination and Analysis The criterion for proving the Positive Attributes with respect to God is that an attribute which exists from the perfections of the Being by Himself (the Absolute Being) exists in God in the most perfect and complete manner, for it is impossible for God who is the Necessary Being to have no existential perfections.
However, some attributes are perfections of a particular being and not by the Being that exists by Himself; for example, seeing by means of the faculty of sight, ability to walk [by feet], and the like (from among the perfections of the natural creatures). Such existential perfections cannot be established for God because doing so necessitates corporeality ( jasmāniyyah ), movement, change and other attributes of deficiency which are concomitant with contingency ( imkān ) and insufficiency.