And since the ontological peculiarity of human actions is...

And since the ontological peculiarity of human actions is their being adherents and free, it follows that as demanded by the realness and conformity of the Divine knowledge with the known thing ( ma‘lūm ) as well as the fixedness and certainty of the Divine will, the actions of human agents are volitional and voluntary and not fatalistic and involuntary.

In reply to the misgiving regarding predeterminism on the basis of the eternal knowledge of God, Ṣadr al-Muta’allihīn has said: “Although the knowledge of God is a cause ( sabābiyyah ) with respect to the materialization of man’s action, its being a cause is through the agency of man’s ability and freewill, for his ability and freewill are also among the causes of the materialization of his action. The incumbency of the materialization of the action thus emanates from man’s ability and free-will.

Incumbency emanates from free-will and it is not in conflict with it.”[^15] A refutation is also given to this misgiving that if the knowledge of the past is the source of the action’s fatalistic nature, God cannot also be a free agent. Sa‘d al-Dīn al-Taftazānī has also mentioned these two answers in refuting the notion of predeterminism on the basis of the eternal knowledge and will of God. Moreover,