THE MEANING OF ‘ONE’ AND ‘MANY’ The truth is that the...

THE MEANING OF ‘ONE’ AND ‘MANY’ The truth is that the concepts of unity (wahdah) and multiplicity (katsrah) - as with the concepts of existence, contingency and the like - are general concepts, which are impressed on the mind with a primary impression (i.e. without the mediation of any intermediary concepts).

Hence such definitions of them as have been suggested - such as, “The one is that which is indivisible, from the aspect of its indivisibility,” and “The many is that which is divisible, from the aspect of its divisibility” - are verbal definitions.

📌For it they were taken to be true definitions, they would not be free from defect due to the dependence of the concept of ‘one’ on that of ‘what is divisible,’ which is the same as ‘many,’ and the dependence of the concept of ‘many1 on that of ‘divisible,’ which is identical with it. Unity is the mode of indivisibility, and multiplicity that of divisibility. Note Unity coincides with existence from the viewpoint of extension (mishdâq), but differs from it in respect of intension (mafhûm).

Hence every existent qua existent is one, in the same way as every ‘one’ qua ‘one’ is existent. An objection may be raised here which may be stated as follows: The division of unconditioned (muthlaq) existence into ‘one’ and ‘many’ implies that what is ‘many’ should as well be existent like the ‘one,’ for it is a division of existence. It also implies that ‘many’ is other than ‘one,’ being different from it; for the two are divisions, and divisions necessarily exclude one another.

It follows that some existents that are ‘many’ in respect of their multiplicity are not ‘one.’ This contradicts the statement that “every existent is one.” The answer to this objection is that ‘one’ here possesses two different considerations (i’tibâr). In one consideration it is considered in itself, without comparing it with ‘many,’ and this includes that which is ‘many.’ Therefore, ‘many’ qua existent is ‘one,’ and it has one existence.

That is why it yields to enumeration, as when we say, for instance, one dozen, two dozen and so on, or one set, two sets, three sets and so on. There is another consideration for ‘one’ wherein it is opposed to ‘many’ and contrary to it. To explain, at one time we consider existence in itself and as being opposed to absolute non-existence. In this consideration it becomes identical with ‘externality’ and the mode of possession of external properties (atsâr).

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