in relation to the Necessary Being and contingent beings...
in relation to the Necessary Being and contingent beings, have done so in order to avoid the conclusion that there is a similarity ( sinkhiyyah ) between cause and effect, or between the Necessary Being and contingent existents. However, such a position stands refuted, because it amounts to suspending the intellect’s cognitive faculties.
To elaborate, if in the statement, ‘The Necessary Being exists,’ we understand ‘existence’ to mean the same as what it means in a statement asserting the existence of a contingent being, it implies that ‘existence’ is univocal ( mushtarak ma’nawi ).
If what is understood in the former statement [by ‘existence’] were the opposite of that which is understood in the latter, being the contradictory of the latter, the statement ‘The Necessary Being exists,’ would amount to the negation of Its existence. Finally, if nothing were understandable from it, that would amount to a suspension of the intellect’s cognitive faculties, which is not however the state in which we find ourselves.
الفصل الثالث في أن الوجود زائد على الماهية عارض لها --------------------------------------------------- بمعنى أن المفهوم من أحدهما غير المفهوم من الآخر فللعقل أن يجرد الماهية و هي ما يقال في جواب ما هو عن الوجود فيعتبرها وحدها فيعقلها ثم يصفها بالوجود و هو معنى العروض فليس الوجود عينا للماهية و لا جزءا لها. و الدليل عليه أن الوجود يصح سلبه عن الماهية و لو كان عينا أو جزءا لها لم يصح ذلك لاستحالة سلب عين الشيء و جزئه عنه.
و أيضا حمل الوجود على الماهية يحتاج إلى دليل فليس عينا و لا جزءا لها لأن ذات الشيء و ذاتياته بينة الثبوت له لا تحتاج فيه إلى دليل و أيضا الماهية متساوية النسبة في نفسها إلى الوجود و العدم و لو كان الوجود عينا أو جزءا لها استحالت نسبتها إلى العدم الذي هو نقيضه 1.3. EXISTENCE IS ADDITIONAL TO QUIDDITY A thing’s existence is additional to its quiddity, in the sense, that each of them [i.e. ‘existence’ and ‘quiddity’] signifies something not understandable from the other.
From existence, the intellect first abstracts [or divests] quiddity, which is represented by the answer to the question, ‘What is it?’ Then the intellect considers it in isolation and attributes existence to it. This is what is meant by predication [ ‘urud , i.e. ascription of existence to quiddity]. Hence existence is neither identical with quiddity nor a part of it. A proof of it is that one may properly negate existence in relation to quiddity.