The backing of being part of a form of human life in which...

The backing of being part of a form of human life in which our desires and dispositions would be formed and trained toward a recognition and pursuit of certain goods (Plato and Aristotle); the backing of being part of a set of divine commandments, obedience to which will be rewarded and disobedience to which will be punished (Christianity); and the backing of being instructed as to what action will produce for us most of what we now want (the sophists and Hobbes).

Each of these answers specifies a different morality; and each of them specifies a different logical form and status for moral judgments. For the first, the key concept is “good,” used functionally; and the key judgments are that certain things, sections, or people are good-that is, are well fitted for certain roles or functions in the background picture of social life which this view always has to presuppose.

For the second, the key concept is expressed by “Thou shalt,” and the key judgments express consequences of reward and punishment. For the third, the key concepts are those of means to a given end, of our desires as they are; and the key judgments are of corresponding form. It is of course obvious, and has already been stressed, that it is possible to combine and vary these three in all sorts of ways: Aquinas’ blend of Greek and Christian is the most important. But how do we decide between them?

Clearly to lay down some logical form as the form of the moral judgment and to rule out others as illegitimate would itself be an arbitrary and illegitimate procedure.

But what we can do is to note the theory of human nature and of the physical universe presupposed by each different view; and if we do so the superiority of the Greek view -at least in its Aristotelian form-to either of its rivals appears plain-on at least two counts in respect of Christianity, and on at least one as regards the “actions whose consequences will be most desirable” view. Begin with the latter: quite clearly our desires as they are stand in need of criticism and correction.

Those who speak blandly of moral rules as designed to maximize pleasure and minimize pain have apparently never reflected on such questions as whether the pleasure afforded to medieval Christians or modern Germans by persecuting Jews did not perhaps outweigh the pain caused to Jews and therefore justify the persecution.