Ijtihad in its general meaning There are various definitions...

Ijtihad in its general meaning There are various definitions for Ijtihad in its general meaning, some of which follow: A) “Ijtihad is the jurisprudent’s best attempt to reach understanding (and certainty) about Islamic rules.”[^11] B) “Ijtihad is making effort in recognizing conjectural religious rules[^12] to such an extent that no greater effort is possible.”[^13] C) “Ijtihad is obtaining religious rules from explanatory reasons.”[^14] D) “Making every effort in reaching a conjecture to religious rules, in such a way that reaching beyond it would be impossible.”[^15] E) “Ijtihad is the disposition ( malakah )[^16] to obtain the proof of religious rules or practical duties, either a religious or a logical proof.”[^17] These are general definitions for Ijtihad found in the scholars’ books.

Each of them is subject to some criticisms and there is controversy about their scope of inclusion. But they all seem to have a common point and that is the concept of “attempting to obtain religious rules via some reasons.” There is controversy on whether some reasons such as Qiyas (analogy), Istihsan (approbation), masalih mursalah and khabar wahid (one tradition)… etc, are really proof; and that if they are reasons, what their requirements are.

That is why Muhaqqiq Hilli, when defining Ijtihad from the viewpoint of jurisprudents, begins like this: “Making effort in obtaining religious rules.”[^18] Then he adds: “Accordingly, obtaining rules from religious reasons is Ijtihad, since this requires exerting views and cannot be done with regard to manifestations of the religion.” ^19 He continues: “That reason may be Qiyas (analogy) or something else.

Hence, Qiyas can be a kind of Ijtihad.” ^20 Here, Muhaqqiq Hilli poses a problem and the answer to it: “If one says: ‘So, Imamiyyah (Twelver Shi’a) accepts Ijtihad.’ I reply: Yes, it is so, but there is a paradox here, because Qiyas is considered as a means for Ijtihad. But if Qiyas is excluded, we accept Ijtihad as obtaining rules through theoretical ways (means) other than Qiyas .”[^21] Some may think this definition of Muhaqqiq Hilli is about the special meaning of Ijtihad.

But it is not true, since he considers as Ijtihad issues such as concluding from traditions either substituting full with conditional, or general with specific, and other conclusions and also opposition of traditions with each other, preference or option of them; whereas Ijtihad in its special meaning does not include these issues.