We have ourselves explained in our discussions of the...

We have ourselves explained in our discussions of the principles of jurisprudence that it is not rational to anticipate any context which is not syntactic or which does not appear immediately in the construction of a sentence. In fact, even those contexts, which are in the syntax, can be ignored if they have been caused by the carelessness of the speaker or negligence of the listeners. But in this case, we maintain that this principle does not apply.

Here, there are the believers in Tahrif, who say that something is lost, and therefore, reason will guide us to restrain from relying solely upon the existing literal text of the Qur’an. Let us say, for example, a scripture is found which instructs its followers to buy a house.

Now if a follower found out that certain parts of the scripture have been ruined or missing, suspecting that those missing parts may have further specifica­tions with regard to the size of a house to be bought, or its value or location, it would be quite rational for him to refrain from purchasing a house. He cannot take the existing text as complete, and if he bought a house he would not be sure that he has carried out the intended instruction of his Lord.

The reader may think that with this analogy, the whole foundation of fiqh, together with the system of deductions and inferences of the divine laws would collapse; because they depend chiefly on the traditions reported from the masumin (‘a) (the Prophet (‘s) and his pure progeny). And in these, there is a possibility that their saying may not have been reported with the qualifying contexts. But with little extra effort, this doubt can be allayed.

In the case of the traditions, what is to be followed is the report of a narrator in its complete form. If there was any contextual evidence, he would include it in the narration. The absence of any contextual qualifications or contradictions in the tradition would simply mean that they did not exist. It is now an established fact that belief in Tahrif necessarily means that the text of the Qur’an cannot be taken as an authority.

Some people say that, before accepting this conclu­sion, one must at least have a comprehensive knowledge about those ayahs in which any deficiency may have occurred. I maintain that this does not apply in the case of Tahrif, because comprehensive knowledge becomes credible only when its effect is seen in practice.