Many of them fail because they do not provide a proper...

Many of them fail because they do not provide a proper epistemic defence of philosophy, but simply show it to be of instrumental or aretaic value. In the section following the next, I consider more pressing objections that hold that there is reasonable disagreement among philosophers who are epistemic peers.

If reasonable disagreement is possible, this implies that at least some philosophers can justifiedly say to themselves, ‘Even though my epistemic peers disagree with the theory I believe, my theory is true and I am justified in believing that it is true.’ I will argue that even this sort of defence is not enough to satisfy the truth-seeking, error-avoiding agnostic. This defence at best explains why insider scepticism is unwarranted, but does not explain why outsider scepticism is unwarranted.

That is, the possibility of rational disagreement can explain why we philosophers who have views are not required to give them up in light of disagreement, but it does not explain why a truth-seeking, error-avoiding agnostic should pursue philosophy and come to adopt any views. Previous…