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478-[^502]: [^11] David Christensen, ‘Epistemology of Disagreement: the Good News’, Philosophical Review 116 (2007), pp. 187-[^217]: [^12] Kelly, ‘Epistemic Significance of Disagreement’. [^13] Gideon Rosen, ‘Nominalism, Naturalism, Philosophical Relativism’, Philosophical Perspectives 15 (2001), pp 69-[^91]: [^14] Nicholas Rescher, The Strife of Systems (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1985), pp.

95-[^115]: [^15] Peter van Inwagen, ‘It is Wrong, Everywhere, Always, and for Anyone, to Believe Anything upon Insufficient Evidence’, in Eleonore Stump and Michael J. Murray, eds., Philosophy of Religion: The Big Questions (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), p. [^275]:…