A person who comes to philosophy as a Christian is probably...

A person who comes to philosophy as a Christian is probably more likely to end up being a moral realist and a natural law theorist than his atheist counterpart. A graduate student who studies ethics at Harvard University is probably more likely than a student at Australian National University to become a Kantian.

People have dispositions towards one theory or another, and (in certain respects) non-random factors such as the people with whom they study philosophy affect the probability they will adopt any particular theory. Suppose, however, that our truth-seeking, error-avoiding agnostic has no such dispositions and manages to have even exposure to all competing doctrines.

Will pursuing philosophy assign her to a set of beliefs randomly or in a probability proportional to the positions of her epistemic peers? Perhaps the agnostic will remain agnostic since she has no dispositions.

Without a good empirical account of the mechanisms of belief formation, I cannot be sure whether she has a random chance of adopting any particular theory, adopting a theory with a probability proportionate to the percentage of comparably virtuous philosophers accepting that theory, or has some different probability altogether. From her viewpoint, the process will seem random in some way.

So, I use randomness here as a hopefully good-enough substitute for the actual mechanism that assigns beliefs.[^3] Under some circumstances, it could be reasonable for the outsider to think she has a better chance than others do of getting things right.

For example, consider a an exceptional person with an IQ many times greater than that of the average philosopher, with an exceptional memory, who lived long enough to read every philosophy book ever written, and who exhibited the epistemic virtues far better than Kant or Hume did. This person could legitimately conclude that she might do better than other philosophers have. However, no real agnostic will be this exceptional.

A good response to the sceptical worry should provide reason to pursue philosophy for a truth-seeking, error-avoiding agnostic with epistemic virtue comparable to a typical philosopher’s. Philosophers do seem to aim for truth. Philosophy’s state of dissensus may show us that philosophy is not worth doing if truth is our goal. Pursuing philosophy is not a reliable method of finding to the truth about philosophical issues. Previous…