The establishment of a predicate for the subject has no more than three states...

The establishment of a predicate for the subject has no more than three states: it is either impossible, such as ‘the number three is greater than the number four,’ or it is necessary, such as, ‘the number two is half of four’ or it is neither impossible nor necessary, for instance, ‘the sun is above our head’.

In logical terminology the first proposition has the state of impossibility (imtinā’), the second proposition is given the attribute of necessity (wujūb), and the third state is considered as possible (imkān) However in philosophy only existence is discussed and those things, which are being incapable of being or of occurring and impossible (mumtani’) will never have an existence (al-wujūd al-khāriji).

For this reason philosophy regards existence from an intellectual perception as being either necessary existence or possible existence. Necessary existence is known as an existent, which exists in-itself and does not depend upon another existent. Naturally such an existent will have no beginning and no end, because the non-existence of something in a particular time is an indication that its existence is not from itself.

In order for it to come into existence it needs another existent, which, is the cause or the condition for its realisation. The absence of this condition or cause would be the reason of annihilation. Possible existence (mum’kin al-wujūd) is known as an existent, which does not exist in-itself and depends on another existent in order for it to be realised.

This division, which has taken place through intellectual perception, essentially disregards the existence of the impossible (mumtani’ al-wujūd), but it does not have any indication whether the existent is either a possible existent or necessary existent. In other words the genuineness of this perception can be conceptualised in three essential forms: Every existent is a necessary existent. Every existent is a possible existent.

Some existents are necessary existents and some are possible existents. On the basis of the first and third assumptions, the existence of a necessary existent is established, therefore the assumption that should be reviewed is whether all existents are possible existents or not? However by disproving this assumption (that all existents are possible existents), the existence of the necessary existent is definitely and confidently proven.

The establishment of unity and other attributes must be proven with other arguments.