ভূমিকা
Shiavault - a Vault of Shia Islamic Books Islamic Political Theory (Legislation): Volume 1 Session 23: An Examination of the Essence of Unity in Humanity and the Citizenship of Citizens Islam’s view on root of emergence of rights Discussions in political philosophy have proximity with that of legal philosophy and are integrated in some areas. Common and similar issues are discussed; for example, a legal issue is examined in a political discussion.
On this basis, in the previous session we mentioned an issue in legal philosophy, i.e. the essence of unity in humanity. We said that it is true that all human beings are common in humanity and according to Islam we do not have first class or second class human beings, but it does not necessarily follow that all people are equal in social matters in terms of rights and duties.
In this context, those who are pursuing mischievous motives by portraying themselves as revolutionary Muslim people and utilizing the achievements of the Revolution in favor of their motives are acting against the Revolution by saying that since we do not have first class or second class human beings, all people in society must have the same rights, such as forming a party and acquiring civil and military posts.
According to them, any person, irrespective of his conviction and ideology, can be the president or prime minister. He may form any party he wants. Their argument is that since all human beings are equal, it follows that in spite of their non-acceptance of the Revolution or the Constitution they have the right to enjoy all rights.
In refutation of this fallacy, let us say that it is true that we do not have first or second class human beings, but the source of all rights and duties are certain qualities other than the essence of humanity. Some have not properly understood this fact or out of wicked motives have interpreted it wrongly. Someone says, “We have first class and second class citizens.
The first class citizens are the clergy while the rest are considered second class citizens!” We have no option but to allocate this session to an examination of this allegation and its refutation. In order to clarify this matter, one needs to pay attention to one of the serious debates among legal philosophers of the world on what is essentially the origin of rights? On what basis can we say that a person has the right to do a certain thing?