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Shiavault - a Vault of Shia Islamic Books Aristotelian Perspectives For Post-modern Reason (ii) Practical Truth Aristotle defines prudence ( phrónesis ) as: A true and reasoned state of capacity to act with regard to the things that are good or bad for man[^4] . By this definition he distinguishes prudence from other notions. Given that it is a disposition ( héxis ), it will be distinguished from science ( episteme ), for prudence will be a knowledge linked to human action.

Secondly, as it is practical ( praktike ), its result will be an action, not an object, which distinguishes it from art or technology ( tekhne ). The demand for rationality and truth (‘ ...metà lógoy alethe ’) distinguishes prudence from moral values and sets it among the intellectual virtues. Lastly, the fact that it concerns good and evil for mankind , and not good and evil as abstract concepts, differentiates prudence and wisdom ( sophia ).

Prudence is not science, but neither is it simple opinion or skill[^5] , it is genuine rational knowledge with the intention of objective truth. The truth of human action falls within the jurisdiction of the Aristotelian concept of practical truth , the kind of truth that seeks prudence: Now this kind of intellect and of truth - according to EN - is practical [...] of the part which is practical and intellectual the good state is truth in agreement with right desire[^6] .

Practical truth has two dimensions: concord between desire and intellect (which is why it is a kind of truth) and creation of an objective good (which is why it is practical). When there is agreement between desire and intelligence, an objective good is also produced, in the world by the action and in the subject that constructs and improves itself.

So practical truth does not consist only in the agreement between two human faculties, but also has an objective dimension: It is well said, then, that it is by doing just acts that the just man is produced [...] without doing these no one would have even a prospect of becoming good. But most people do not do these, but take refuge in theory [...] behaving somewhat like patients who listen attentively to their doctors, but do none of the things they are ordered to do[^7] .

That is, in order to know truthfully what is good for man, one must do it: For the things we have to learn before we can do them, we learn by doing them[^8] .