If coercive, the public utilitarian consideration was of secondary concern.

If coercive, the public utilitarian consideration was of secondary concern. Game theory and cosmopolitanism will be subsequently followed by my discussion on the principles, norms and rules of the human rights regime. In the end, I shall discuss the process of the international human rights regime formation. My conclusion will dwell upon both the contribution and limits of human rights in international politics.

Regime Theories Elsewhere I have argued that the literature on international relations does not revolve round a single theory.[^3] The literature centred on regime analysis­regimes are defined as sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actor’s expectations converge in a given issue area[^4] - does not present a coherent whole either.

Yet, it is quite safe to argue that the regime literature focuses on economic behaviour, departing from traditional concerns with military security. Through the works of such scholars as Ernst Haas, regime analysis emerged out of an earlier concern with functionalism and integration.[^5] However, the chief point of departure has been recognised as Keohane and Nye’s Power and Interdependence .[^6] Under conditions of interdependence, they argued that sovereignty had not yet withered away.

However, states could no longer exercise absolute control over international economic movements. Non-state actors, entities and institutions whether transnational, transgovernmental or intergovernmental were incorporated in regime literature. In 1983, Krasner and his co-authors tried to synthesise a theoretical framework on regime analysis.

Krasner himself identified three perspectives: structuralism, Grotian and modified structuralism.[^7] According to Waltz, of the three dimensions in structuralism that is, the distribution of capabilities, the ordering principles and the function of the units, only the distribution of capabilities actually matters. In analysing international-political structure, Waltz argues that: We do not ask whether states are revolutionary or legitimate, authoritarian or democratic, ideological or pragmatic.

We abstract from every attribute of states except their capabilities ... We ask what range of expectations arises merely from looking at the type of order that prevails among them and at the distribution of capabilities within that order...