Although the ‘Abbasids present at this meeting made a...

Although the ‘Abbasids present at this meeting made a nominal pledge to Muham­mad al-Nafs al-Zakiyya, al-Sadiq seems to have been aware of the possibility that their involvement with the revolutionaries, part­icularly the Kaysaniyya or its Hashimiyya branch; would be successful and that they would replace the Umayyads. Also al-Sadiq knew he was the true divinely appointed Imam of the Muslims and he achieved the Imamate by the testament of his father, Imam al-Baqir.

Thus people should rally around him to recover his right in the caliphate. Al-Sadiq's view did not please the ‘Abbasids, so, they carried out their underground activities against the Umayyads without his participation. When the ‘Abbasids succeeded in seizing the reins of power in 132/749 they were naturally aware of the danger from their kinsmen, the ‘Alids, whose claims to succession would be greater than their own if ‘Ali's right to the caliphate were to be accepted by the general populace.

As a result the ‘Alids now faced ‘Abbasid oppression more severe than that of the Umayyads[^5]. The motives for this oppression seem to have been first of all doctrinal. The early members of the ‘Abbasid family, such as ‘Abd Allah b. ‘Abbas[^6], had confirmed ‘Ali's right to the Imamate (the political and religious authority) by relating many traditions attributed to the Prophet supporting it.

They had also supported ‘Ali against the first three Caliphs and participated in the Caliphate of ‘Ali, and they gave some support to his son al-Hasan.[^7] In the eyes of the ‘Alids by taking over the Caliphate the ‘Abbasids became usurpers of the political authority of the Imamate. Hence the ‘Abbasids became suspicious of the ‘Alid attitude toward their authority.

Secondly there were economic motives for the ‘Abbasid oppression since Imam al-Sadiq continued to collect the khums secretly from his followers[^8], an act which the ‘Abbasids considered as a preparatory step towards some conspiracy to overthrow them. These two factors obliged the ‘Abbasids to keep al­-Sadiq in Medina and to hold his followers, especially in Iraq and later in Egypt, under close scrutiny as measures to ensure the security of the state.

Thus al-Sadiq maintained an externally quiescent policy towards the ‘Abbasids.