A thing is that which is doable possible to do.

A thing is that which is doable possible to do. Here another question may be asked: There are many things, which are thought to be impossible and not power-dependent, yet we see or hear that they had been done by Allah. For example, if it is said that a huge heap of fire had been turned into a cool garden of flowers, we would say: impossible! Fire burns the flower, never turns to flower. How can a heap of kindled fire change into flowers?

This is impossible, but we do know that Allah had turned the fire, in which Prophet Abraham (A.S.) was thrown, into a garden of flowers. To answer this, we must explain the kinds of the impossible. Kinds of the Impossible Things which are regarded, in the arguments of the gnostics as "the impossible", are divided into three kinds: Self-impossible, occurance-impossible and common-impossible.

The self-impossible is that which is supposed to bear in itself its contradiction, such as to say that the light which is dark, or the light which has no light, the black which is white or the black which is not black. This very supposition is impossible, i.e. the very supposition is self-contradicting. (If we ask: a light which is like darkness in proportion to another light, it is a different subject.

But the supposition that a light, though being a light, is not a light, is a contradiction.) So, the supposition which contradicts itself is called self-impossible. Occurance-impossible means that the supposition in itself is not impossible, but that we have added to it another supposition which made it impossible, such as supposing the appearance of an effect without its exclusive cause.

In this case the appearance of this effect is not impossible in itself, because it certainly comes into existence when its exclusive cause is there. But we added the supposition that its cause was not there. So, the occurance of such an effect without its exclusive cause is .impossible. Furthermore, this is not a power - dependant case, since it is contradictory. By saying that this effect has an exclusive cause we mean that without its exclusive cause it cannot come into existence.

So, to suppose that it can be implemented without its exclusive cause is but a contradiction. Therefore, ability covers neither the self-impossible nor the occurence-impossible. It belongs to common-impossible. Miracles are of the common-impossible kind, that is, the appearance of something not from its common outlet.