Thus, in the introduction to Intentionality , Searle praises...

Thus, in the introduction to Intentionality , Searle praises the methodological advantages of approaching the analysis of mental phenomena from the perspective of intentionality in the following terms: “one advantage to this approach, by no means a minor one, is that it enables us to distinguish clearly between the logical properties of Intentional states and their ontological status; indeed, on this account, the question concerning the logical nature of Intentionality is not an ontological problem at all.”[^40] Searle believes that a logical approach to intentional phenomena can allow him to repeat the success of his logical analyses of obligation in “How to Derive ‘Ought’ From ‘Is’”.

In Rationality in Action , still more recently, Searle has suggested that we can enjoy some of these same benefits by providing a logical account of notions such as self, freedom, and responsibility; that is, that we can talk about these notions without having to deal with the embarrassing ontological questions that had affected their treatment in earlier times.

In tandem with the shunning of realism as it pertains to ethics, of course, goes the shunning of precisely those types of normativity which are not soft. We can morally criticize Nazi institutions; we can accept that promises do not obligate if what is promised is itself immoral, we can expect - and some times accept - apologies when we are wronged.

But to tackle theoretically these genuinely moral dimensions of social institutions we need to go beyond merely tracing the logical paths connecting speech acts, institutions and consequent obligations. To see what more is needed , let us pay closer attention to the normativity that is associated with our intentional states. This is, we suggest, more fundamental than the normativity associated with speech acts.

Paradoxically, perhaps, we find some support for this thesis in Searle’s own philosophy, above all at the outset of Intentionality , where he writes: A basic assumption behind my approach to problems of language is that the philosophy of language is a branch of the philosophy of mind.