The Likelihood Principle a much better way to understand the...

The Likelihood Principle a much better way to understand the inference to the best explanation, since in the case of God a hypothesis is being formed on the basis of observations, in the teleological sense. Paley, according to Sober, is attempting to apply the Likelihood Principle to the watch example.

That is, given that the watch is intricate and well-designed for timekeeping (O), the inference that it was designed by an intelligent creator (H1) is higher than the conclusion that it came into being via random natural processes. Symbolically written it would be stated: P(O/H1) >> P(O/H2).

Paley next argues that if one accepts the above reasoning one is then obliged to accept the reasoning he gives for the universe as a whole, which is as follows: O - The world is intricate and well-designed for the purpose of supporting life. H1 - The world is the product of an intelligent designer. H2 - The world is the product of random physical processes. Given the above, again Paley's claim would be that P(O/H1) >> P(O/H2).

Both of the above are inferences to the best explanation on the basis of the Likelihood Principle outlined earlier [Sober, p. 33]. Sober later rejects the notion presented by Paley, and argues that the likelihood of an evolutionary hypothesis supersedes the likelihood of a creationist hypothesis. Al-Kindi also attempts to make reference to the teleological proof (dalil al-'indyah) for the existence of God.

He argues that "the orderly and wonderful phenomena of nature could not be purposeless and accidental" [Kindi, p. 61]. This is consistent with the Quranic verse "Not for (idle) sport did We create the heavens and the earth and all that is between!" [Yusuf Ali, Quran 21:16].

The teleological argument analyses the material world and infers from it an Artificer or a creator, a self-conscious being of unlimited intelligence and power, who created this extremely complex world for a purpose and that creator is God.

Muhammad Iqbal once again criticizes this argument in the following terms: At best, it [teleological proof] gives us a skillful external contriver working on a pre-existing dead and intractable material the elements of which are, by their own nature, incapable of orderly structures and combinations.