Government and Politics – Al-Shia

Government and Politics – Al-Shia The al-Shia Scientific, Cultural, and Doctrinal Website Sun, 10 Nov 2024 09:41:15 +0000 en-US Government and Politics – Al-Shia 32 32 Wilāyat al-Faqīh: Exigency and Presuppositions Part 2 This is a continuation of the write up titled Wilāyat al-Faqīh: Exigency and Presuppositions written by Ayatollah Misbah Yazdei. In this part, we shall look at the presuppositions of the theory of Wilāyat al-Faqīh The presuppositions of the theory of Wilāyat al-Faqīh According to Islam, the theory of wilāyat al-faqīh is among the subjects of the philosophy of politics. Every theory has to be based on an array of prescribed principles and presumptions accepted by those who regard the theory as valid. A thorough examination of the principles that confirm the soundness of the theory of wilāyat al-faqīh and establish its superiority to other theories of the philosophy of politics naturally requires numerous discussions and voluminous books, which is not our concern as of the moment. Some of these discussions like those related to the exigency of government can be found in the book, Ḥuqūq wa Siyāsat dar Qur’ān [Law and Politics in the Qur’an]. Nevertheless, we will touch on whatever relevant to the issues treated in this volume. 1. The need for government The first principle and presupposition of the theory of wilāyat al-faqīh, which is approved by most other political theories is the principle of the society’s need for government. It is opposed only by anarchism. Anarchists believe that people conduct themselves well by abiding by moral principles without the need for government, or they at least advocate the idea that the government should move in a direction leading to this end. That is, activities are carried out alongside the process of educating the people whereupon there is no need for government. The other philosophical schools, however, consider such proposition unrealistic. Also in practice, thousands of years of experience show that in all times there are individuals who are indifferent to moral laws and if there is no authority to control them, social life will end up in chaos and turmoil. In any case, the principle of the society’s need for government which is accepted by all schools of political philosophy, with the exception of anarchism, is affirmed by the theory of wilāyat al-faqīh. 2. The legitimacy to govern is inherent in no individual or group We can define ‘government’ in a simple way as “the apparatus which oversees the collective conduct of society and strives to direct it to a specific end.” Authority is either exercised through peaceful means or through the use of force. In other words, if some individuals refuse to follow the direction set by the government, they will be compelled to comply with the rules set by the government by force and the use of military and disciplinary organs. This definition along with its explanation applies to both legitimate and illegitimate governments. Therefore, we ought to know what the criterion or the condition of the legitimacy of a government is. Is legitimacy inherent in any individual or group? Or, is it inherent [ dhātī ] in anyone but something delegated by someone else? Some philosophers and schools of political philosophy hold that if someone has a superior and greater physical power, or is brighter and more intelligent than others, or racially superior to them, naturally such a person is good enough to be a ruler. Although these observations are attributed to some statesmen and political philosophers, the political foundations of the theory of wilāyat al-faqīh are contrary to them. This theory is founded on the presupposition that the right to rule is inherent to no one and is not automatically assigned to anyone. That is, no one has a legal right to be a ruler due to his being born of a certain parentage. The right to rule is not something hereditary that can be transferred from one’s father and mother. Rather, the legitimacy of a ruler and government must emanate from another source. Most philosophers and political philosophy theoreticians accept this principle and also the previous one, and the majority of schools of political philosophy such as the schools supportive of democracy agree with our idea that the right to rule and govern (i.e., legitimacy) is inherited by nobody and it is not automatically assigned to anyone. Rather, it is supposed to be delegated to others by the authority to whom this right originally and essentially belongs. As such, by establishing these two principles, we have excluded anarchism and the schools and theoreticians that assume that certain individuals and groups automatically and inherently have legitimacy to govern and so they are naturally superior to others. 3. God as the only essential source of legitimacy After the acceptance of the second principle, this question will naturally surface: What is that source which grants legal authority and legitimacy to a ruler and government? So it is in this point that the theory of wilāyat al-faqīh and political philosophy of Islam differ from most other schools especially the current theories. According to this principle which is one of the key foundations of the theory of wilāyat al-faqīh and political philosophy of Islam and accepted unanimously by Muslims and perhaps, by many religions with divine origins apart from Islam, the right to rule and govern, to bid and forbid, originally belongs to God, the Exalted. Of course, it is worth noting that “to govern” in its specific sense and that is one’s performing of certain actions and direct management of the affairs applies only to human beings, and it is not applicable to God, the Exalted. But its broad sense which involves the instinctive right to rule and to designate the ruler is ascribed to God, the Exalted—the Lord and the Real Owner of everything who has created the world and all beings including man: لِّلَّهِ ما فِي السَّمَاواتِ وَمَا فِي الأَرْضِ “ To Allah belongs whatever is in the heavens and whatever is in the earth [1].” Here “real ownership” is used as distinct from “nominal ownership”. In the case of nominal ownership, a person is recognized as “owner” according to a contract between a number of individuals. So, this contract may not be identical in all societies. For example, it might be that in a certain society the contract considers those who find any gold mine, for instance, to be its owners, but in another society it considers all mines as the property of the public and the government is to take charge of them. Real ownership, however, arises from a sort of ontological relationship in which the existence of the owned thing [ mamlūk ] is originally ascribed to the existence of the owner [ mālik ]. This kind of relationship is technically called the cause-and-effect relationship. In such an ownership the “contract” does not stipulate that the owned thing belongs to the owner, rather the owned thing truly and ontologically belongs to the Owner and owes existence to Him. Accordingly, since all human beings are created by God, they are all owned by Him. Therefore, the human being not only has no authority whatsoever over other human beings but has no inherent authority over himself because the possessor of authority is someone else. In accordance with this conviction, no human being has the right to amputate any organ of his body, blind his eyes, or commit suicide because the existence of any human being belongs to someone else. Most of the schools of political philosophy and other cultures oppose this presupposition and hol