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Shiavault - a Vault of Shia Islamic Books Islam and the Contemporary Man Chapter 8: Essence and Existence Skeptics: Opponents of Realism Question In the history of philosophy there have always been anti-realists who claim that all our perceptions are illusory. The more radical ones even doubt their own doubt, thereby rejecting any possibility of real knowledge. In the sphere of philosophy, they are referred to as skeptics.
Would you please provide a brief but reasoned philosophic argument against their position? Answer Skeptics are of three persuasions. Some skeptics say that the only realities whose existence we may ascertain are ourselves and our thoughts; all else is an illusion. The more extreme skeptics go even further, claiming that the only reasonable position to hold regarding knowledge is solipsism: only I and my thoughts are definitely real. The most extreme, however, doubt even their own doubt.
According to the latter, knowledge is impossible. The falsity of this position, however, is definitively demonstrated in epistemology. We know without doubt and based on our God-given intuition that there is a reality independent of and external to us. Against the skeptics, we hold that there are many real objects, each one of which is distinct from all others and possesses properties peculiar to it. Each external object can in the mind be described by two concepts: essence and existence.
The absence of either of the two concepts means that the object in question is illusory. Assuming that John is a real human being, the concept of John in the mind can be the subject of two predicates: human being, as its essence, and existence, indicating its objective reality. Both of these concepts are critical if we are to believe that John really exists. Nevertheless, the two concepts are fundamentally different. Existence is the negation of nonexistence , and as such the two cannot concur.
The two contradictory concepts may, however, be alternatively predicated of a thing’s essence (in our case, human being as John’s essence). Another issue in regard to the two concepts, essence and existence, is that they cannot both be exemplifiable by objective reality, for if they were, every object would be in effect two objects—which is absurd.
For this reason, one of the two is truly objective (i.e., it has objective instances) while the other is applicable to external objects only through the mediation of the objective one.