In other words...

In other words, one of the two concepts is a mere abstraction and as such is exemplifiable owing to its concomitance with the objective concept. So the question is: which of the two is objective? To answer this question, it suffices to notice that a thing possesses objective reality only when existence can be predicated of it; its essence in and of itself may or may not exist. Thus, it is existence that is objective, not the essence of the object in question.

Based on this argument, the correct philosophic position is that existence is the objective concept. As such, the other views—mainly, the opposite view that essence is objective and existences subjective—are false. Another issue that merits mention here is the gradational [ tashkiki ] status of existence. But first let us point out that logicians identify two types of universals: 1) those that permit of various degrees [ mushakkik ], 2) those that are not such [ mutawati ].

The universals that are of the latter type are instantiated by objects that partake of that universal in question equally. For instance, human being : all human beings are equally human beings, and if there are any differences between the various individuals of this class it is due to the extrinsic qualities (e.g., height, weight, age) that are not contained in the concept of human being .

On the other hand, a gradational universal is that whose instances differ in their exemplification of the universal in question. Such as light: there are brighter lights and there are less bright lights; they are all instances of light, but they differ in regard to intensity, although this difference itself arises from the essence of light not from any extrinsic quality.

The majority of the sensory qualities are gradational: visual qualities such as light (as was mentioned), distance, dimension; auditory qualities, that is, the various sounds; olfactory qualities, that is, the various smells; gustatory qualities, that is, the various tastes; and finally the tangible qualities.

The difference that distinguishes the various instances of these qualities lies in their very essence, not in any extrinsic quality (one distance is shorter than another; one sound is louder than another; one smell is more pungent or more pleasant than another; one taste is more delectable than another; one object is softer or warmer than another). Of course, on examination one will realize that there is a subtle point here.